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Abstract 
 
The Anti-Money laundering law (AMLA) is a financial regulation enacted mainly because of external demand, as the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) called on the Philippine Government to comply with the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regime. The FATF not only summoned the Philippine 
Government, but also determined the shape  and  content  of  the  AMLA by  requiring  the  institutional policy  actors  to conform  to the  global 
standards. Thus, the FATF exercised direct powers — agenda setting and decision making — in persuading the Philippine Government to enact the 
law. The institutional policy actors were impelled to prioritize the consideration and deliberation of the financial regulation (agenda setting) and 
compelled to enact and rework the content of the policy to conform to the FATF standard within a time frame (decision-making). The FATF’s use of 
direct powers was made possible and reinforced by the context-shaping power of the prevailing financial structure, specifically, the establishment 
of the AML regime. Context-shaping bound the institutional actors to enact the policy because of the prevailing AML regime established by the 
FATF. As the context-shaping power underscored the exercise of the agenda-setting and decision-making powers, the lawmaking experience that 
created the AMLA highlights the employment of the different dimensions of power as well as the contemporary dynamics in the global financial 
structure vis-à-vis the policymaking process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Power  is  pervasive  in politics,  as  the  practice  of  the  latter  entails  the  exercise  of  the  former.  In  the  praxis  of  the  political, 
policymaking is the central activity where power is utilized in the process as well as in shaping the outcome. As the principal political 
institution in society, the Government assumes the mandate of undertaking such activity. The Government makes public policies 
that go through the lawmaking process. The process entails the exercise of influence and power, as the institutional policy actors 
contend with vested interests in crafting policies. 
 
In the era of financial globalization where financial transactions are instantaneous and interconnected, the power dynamics in 
lawmaking has been refashioned. One effect of financial globalization is the reorientation of the power relations among policy actors 
in some areas, such as financial regulations. International organizations are added to the policy equation, as the external actor 
becomes an influential policy actor. In effect, the encroachment of international organizations on lawmaking is reshaping the power 
relation to their advantage. 
 
This paper is about the power dynamics at work in policymaking. The study analyzed the power play involving the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) and the governmental policy actors in crafting the Anti-Money Laundering Law (AMLA, Republic Act 9160) and its 
amendment, Republic Act 9194, in the Philippines, as well as the consequence of the anti-money laundering (AML) regime in the 
power dynamics of the policy process. With the use of the framework of analysis developed by Hay [1], the paper surveyed how the 
FATF functioned and utilized power to bring about financial regulation. Specifically, the paper examined the use of agenda-setting, 
decision-making, and context-shaping powers in enacting the AMLA. 
 
2. Framework of Analysis: The Three Dimensions of Power 
 
The centrality of the concept of power is well established in the study of politics and has been acknowledged by most scholars and 
practitioners in the realm of the political. As the field of study recognizes the essentiality of the concept, however, the discipline also  
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acknowledged  the perennial problem  of defining power.  For  instance, referring  to the ongoing debate about the nature and 
definition of power, Hay noted that the controversy “rests fundamentally on the tension between a concept of power that is simple, 
precise and potentially quantifiable and one which is more complex and intuitively appealing, yet which is much more difficult to 
catalogue and measure” [1].  
 
Notwithstanding the problem, power has been generally viewed from the purview of a particular school of thought in the study of 
politics.  The  pluralist  conception of  power dominates political  science,  where  power  is  considered  “transparent,  expressed  in 
unambiguous  and  empirically  demonstrable  way  in  the  decision-making  process”  [1];  while  the  realist  conception  of  power 
dominates international relations, where power is deemed as the “ability of states to use material resources to get others to do 
what  they  otherwise  would  not”  [2].  Both  conceptions  are  rooted  on  the  classic  Dahlian  definition—  power  over  another 
conceptualization, where one exercises control over another to the extent that the former can get someone to do something that 
otherwise  the  latter would not want  to do  [3]. The directness  of effect on political actors has made the definition the most 
influential view of power in the study of politics. The dominance of the Dahlian definition, in effect, has developed into a simplified 
but one-dimensional view of power. 
   
The constricted view of power has resulted in the underdevelopment of the concept. To deal with this inadequacy, political scholars 
have underscored the need to expand the outlook, as power is deemed multidimensional in nature. This sentiment has led some 
scholars to critique and reexamine the dominant conception. For instance, Barnett and Duval [2] argued that to have a more robust 
understanding of how power works in international politics, scholars need to see the connection among the multiple conceptions of 
power (e.g., compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power).   
 
In political analysis, the more prominent contemporary literature heeding the call for the reassessment of power is the “faces of 
power” of Hay [1]. Hay discussed the three dimensions of power and argued for the need to redefine power. The first dimension, 
consistent with the Dahlian definition, sees power as decision making— determining the outcome of political decision. The focus of 
analysis is the formal political arena. In this conception, the actors that exercise power are those whose opinion holds sway in the 
decision-making process [1]. The second dimension, following Bachrach and Baratz [4] effort to broaden the definition, sees power 
as not only decision making but also agenda setting— the capability to set the political agenda. The focus is the formal political arena 
as well as the informal processes surrounding the corridors of power. The conception for a more inclusive definition of power is 
grounded on the argument that through the agenda-setting process, powerful actors get to decide which issues become subject to 
the formal decision-making process and which do not [1]. 
 
The third dimension, following Lukes’ attempt to incorporate the Marxist notion of “false consciousness” to the definition, sees 
power as not only decision-making and agenda setting but also preference shaping— influencing others by shaping what they think, 
want, or need [5]. The focus is on the formal political arena and the informal processes, as well as the broader civil society in which 
preferences are shaped. In this conception, powerful actors not only exercise power over and set the agenda, but also distort the 
perception and the perceived interest  of the people  [1] through  ideological indoctrination or psychological  control  [6].  Lukes’ 
attempt to broaden the definition, however, created complications in the conceptualization, as determining power in preference 
shaping indicates a need to differentiate between genuine interests and false interest of the actors. Identifying real from false 
interests entails a normative judgment, which presupposes superiority in one (ability to see and make correct judgment about real 
interest) and inferiority in another (subjectively judge the incorrect interest). This praxis implies a condescending relationship, which 
from the academic vantage point, makes the undertaking highly biased, subjective, and empirically unjustifiable. 
 
As a remedy, that is, to maintain the three-dimensional perspective but eliminate the value judgment in the conception, Hay [1] 
proposed that the definition of power emphasize not only the consequences of one’s choices on the actions of another, but also 
their effects on the context within which subsequent action must take place. Power then could be seen as both context shaping and 
conduct  shaping.  The  former  refers  to  the  “capacity of actors  to  redefine  the parameters  of  what  is  socially,  politically,  and 
economically possible for the others,” and the latter refers to the ability of actors “to influence directly the actions and/or choices of 
another individual or group” [1]. The distinction entails two forms: indirect (context shaping) and direct (conduct shaping) power. On 
one hand, indirect power emphasizes, “power relations in which structures, institutions and organizations are shaped by human 
action in such a way as to alter the parameters of subsequent action” [1]. Indirect power may also serve as the potential basis for 
exercise of direct power. Thus, the effect of indirect power is latent, as the exercise of this power creates an atmosphere that 
restricts or limits future actions as well as sets down the grounds for potential exercise of other powers. Direct power, on the other 
hand, has an effect that is immediate, visible, and behavioral, as the exercise of this power is openly felt by the intended recipient.  
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In this paper, the power taxonomy identified would be used to assess the forms of power in play in the process of enacting the 
AMLA. In particular, the workings, impact, and interplay of direct power (power as decision-making and agenda setting), and indirect 
power (power as context shaping) are examined from the beginning to the end of the policymaking process.  
 
   
3. Power as Agenda Setting 
 
Policymaking comprises the whole legislative enterprise of producing public policies. The process begins with policy initiation, where 
demand for a policy arises to meet a certain issue, problem, or contingency. In the case of the AMLA, there was an international 
demand for financial regulation to address the threat that money laundering poses to the stability of the global financial system. 
Money laundering is defined as “a process in which the illicit source of assets obtained or generated by criminal activity is concealed 
to obscure  the  link between  the  funds and  the original criminal  activity”  [7]. This criminal activity has been used by  criminal 
syndicates and terrorist groups to legitimize their illicit finances. To curb the practice, the G-7 member States in 1989 facilitated the 
establishment of the FATF. “The FATF is an intergovernmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies, 
both at national and international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing” [12]. The international organization 
assumed the lead role in combating the worldwide problem of money laundering by mandating that all states legislate the AMLA. 
The FATF mandate was reinforced after the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States, as the incident revealed the urgency of 
the worldwide implementation of financial regulation. 
 
One of the countries identified as lacking the AMLA was the Philippines. The country was on the list of Non-Cooperative Countries 
and Territories  (NCCT) in  2000.  Being on the NCCT list,  the Philippines  was vulnerable to  the  imposition of  countermeasures 
following Recommendations 21 and 22 of the FATF: 
 
21.  Financial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and transactions   with persons, including 
companies and financial institutions, from countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. 
Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose 
should,  as  far  as  possible, be  examined,  the  findings  established  in writing,  and be available  to help  competent 
authorities.  Where  such  a  country  continues  not  to  apply  or  insufficiently  applies  the  FATF  Recommendations, 
countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures. 
 
22.  Financial institutions should ensure that the principles applicable to financial institutions, which are mentioned above 
are also applied to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, especially in countries that do not or 
insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations, to the extent that local applicable laws and regulations permit. When 
local applicable laws and regulations prohibit this implementation, competent authorities in the country of the parent 
institution should be informed by the financial institutions that they cannot apply the FATF Recommendations [12]. 
 
The FATF called on all financial institutions to give “special attention” to business and financial transactions emanating from among 
the  NCCT  to  ascertain  the  lawfulness  of  the  transactions.  Thus,  countermeasures  could  translate  into  a  huge  increase  in  the 
“transaction  cost” of doing business. The  extra scrutiny that might  be  imposed on  financial  transactions  emanating from  the 
Philippines would result in delays. The international financial transactions of local banks and other financial institutions, which run 
into hundreds of millions pesos a day, would no longer be automatically done. Instead, the financial transactions would be handled 
manually. In the globalized era of instantaneous transactions, a delay of a few days or weeks could easily translate into enormous 
financial  losses  and  opportunity  cost.  For  instance,  in  the  committee  hearings  in  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives, 
Department of Justice Undersecretary Jose Calida estimated that the transaction cost due to delays per day could reach P169 million 
in exports, P116 million in imports, and $4 billion in remittances. 
 
The Philippines needed to enact the AMLA as the prerequisite for removal from the blacklist. Noncompliance with the FATF demand 
would  result  in the  imposition  of  more  severe additional  countermeasures.  These  countermeasures  included  the  cooperative 
sanctions of the international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as well as the G-7 
member states. According to Mr. Leonilo Coronel, the Executive Director of the Bankers’ Association of the Philippines (BAP), the 
countermeasures may isolate the Philippine banking system from the rest of the international financial community and make it  
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difficult to transact business. The vulnerability of the Philippines to these sanctions was exacerbated by the current makeup of the 
economy, which is debt-driven and remittance-based. 
 
In  the  past,  Congress  made  several  attempts  to  enact  an  anti-money  laundering  law.  In  the Tenth and  Eleventh  Congresses, 
Congressman Raul Gonzales in the House filed the so-called Rico bill, and the late Senator Robert Barbers in the Senate filed an anti-
money laundering bill. The anti-money laundering bills, however, did not prosper beyond the committee level, as an AML bill was 
not  considered  a  serious  legislative  agenda.    The  legislators  and  the  executive  branch  (Aquino,  Ramos,  Estrada,  and  Arroyo 
administrations) did not see the urgency of the AMLA despite the country being a signatory to international agreements, such as the 
1998 United Nations Political Declaration and Action Plan Against Money Laundering and the 2000 United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, which mandate it.  
 
Only upon the FATF’s decision to put the Philippines on the NCCT list did the government initiate steps to place the AMLA on the 
legislative agenda as well as prioritize its enactment. Following the FATF demand to pass the financial regulation, President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo made a commitment to the FATF on May 2001 that she would certify to the newly elected Twelfth Congress the 
urgency of enacting the AMLA [12]. The executive commitment formally pushed the executive agencies, particularly the Department 
of Finance (DOF), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), and the legislature— the Senate and 
House of Representatives— to take immediate action and cooperate. The enactment of the AMLA became of primordial importance, 
taking precedence over all other pending legislative bills. 
 
Agenda-setting power is “the ability to structure policy debate by controlling which issues are discussed or establishing a priority 
amongst them” [6]. In the agenda setting for the AMLA, the impetus came from an external entity. Before the FATF came into the 
picture, the AMLA was out of the picture in the policy agenda of the institutional policy actors. The FATF demand was the compelling 
factor that prompted the executive and the legislature to consider and undertake the deliberation of the financial regulation.  
 
 
4. Power as Decision Making 
 
The process of  enacting the AMLA was  circumscribed by  the FATF  in  two ways. First,  the  law  must be passed before the 30 
September 2001 deadline. Second, the law must conform to the 40 + 9 Recommendations, which was the FATF mandated global 
standard. The FATF report showed that the Philippines did not have any specific legislation to criminalize money laundering per se 
and did not meet 23 of the 40 Recommendations, and that the current Congress urgently needed to enact the AMLA. The 40 
Recommendations called for the criminalization of money laundering and the 9 Recommendations called for the criminalization of 
the financing of terrorism. Both the deadline and the global standard were unilateral demands of the FATF on the Philippines. The 
failure to enact, enacting after the FATF deadline, or enacting but without conforming to the FATF standard would result in the 
imposition of countermeasures against the Philippines. 
 
The  time frame for passing the AMLA was tight, as  the committee hearing on  the House of Representatives and the Senate 
commenced on the 22nd and 29th of August, respectively; 32 and 39 days before the FATF deadline. Under normal circumstances, 
the number of working days was insufficient to enact a highly complex and contentious law like the AMLA. Twice, the government 
appealed for an extension of the deadline (the first plea was made in the 4
th Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering [APG] meeting 
and the second was at the FATF meeting in Tokyo), but both were turned down by the FATF. The FATF made it clear that the demand 
to enact the AMLA was nonnegotiable. Thus, the unequivocal message was that the Philippines must enact the AMLA on time or 
face the consequences. 
 
To cope with the FATF requirements and avert the grim scenario of facing the countermeasures, the institutional policy actors 
needed to act immediately. On the part of the executive, the DOF, DOJ, and BSP came up with the administrative draft to “guide” 
the legislators. The draft was fed to the committee hearings in both chambers so as to fast-track the deliberations. On the part of 
the legislature, the Senators and the Representatives engaged in express and marathon proceedings to expedite the crafting of the 
law. Moreover, President Arroyo certified the committee reports of both chambers. In effect, the certification dispensed with the 
constitutional requirement of three readings on separate days. Thus, the second and third readings were done on the same day. 
 
The lawmakers took shortcuts in the usual lawmaking practice, such as abruptly replacing (by substitution) the committee report 
with  a  new  working  draft  while  it  was  being  sponsored  in  plenary,  and  limiting  the  bicameral  conference  committee  (BCC)  
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deliberations as well as the ratification of the BCC report in both chambers to just a day. Because of these extraordinary actions 
taken by the legislators, Congress was able to pass the AMLA (Republic Act 9160) a day before the FATF deadline. 
 
The  lawmakers  were  able  to  meet  the  FATF  deadline;  however,  they  committed  lapses  in  conforming  with  the  49  +  9 
Recommendations. Exemplifying the “satisficing” mind-set (just-to-comply attitude), the lawmakers decided to disregard some FATF 
criteria; as a result, the action diluted the policy. The most conspicuous digression of the AMLA was in the issue of threshold amount 
(minimum amount needed to trigger the mechanism for reporting suspicious transactions). The FATF standard for the threshold was 
$10,000 (P500,000), but the Senators and Congressmen set P4 million as the threshold amount in the AMLA.  The decision was seen 
as a compromise to opposing lawmakers to ensure the passing of the AMLA, as it was perceived that lowering the threshold would 
be unacceptable to their wealthy colleagues as well as their moneyed supporters in the business community. 
 
Consequently,  the  FATF  in  its  June  2002  Report  noted  that  some  stipulations  of  R.A.  9160  were  inconsistent  with  49  +  9 
Recommendations. For instance, the FATF report cited: 
 
1.  Although the Philippines’ authorities interpret the regulations as requiring the reporting of all suspicious transactions, 
this nevertheless conflicts with the AMLA, which only requires reporting of high-threshold suspicious transactions.  
 
2.  The law allows the AMLC to access account information upon a court order, but a major loophole remains in that 
secrecy provisions still protect banking deposits made prior to 17 October 2001. Secrecy provisions also still restrict 
bank supervisors’ access to account information [12]. 
 
In view of these deficiencies, the FATF again called on the Philippine Government to take the necessary steps to comply with the 
global  standard.  To  ensure  action,  the  FATF  warned  that  the  Philippines  would  remain  in  the  NCCT  list  and  may  still  face 
countermeasures unless the appropriate legislative amendments were made before 15 March 2003 [12]. 
 
Around September 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives started the deliberations for amending R.A. 9160, while the 
newly created Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) took the lead role in the amendment process on the executive side. With the 
AMLC working as the conduit of information in Congress, the amendment process generally went smoothly in both chambers from 
the committee hearings and plenary debates up to the approval of the reconciled version of the Senate and the House in the BCC. 
With an approved BCC report, the only things needed for the amendment bill to become a law were the plenary ratification of both 
chambers (which is considered as a mere formality) and the signature of the President. 
 
Immediately after the approval of the BCC report, however, the FATF gave indications that the approved report would not be 
acceptable. The FATF continued to see in the BCC report inconsistencies with the 49 + 9 Recommendations, such as the expansion of 
the definition of “covered transaction” to include any suspicious transaction regardless of threshold amount; to make P500,000.00 
the threshold for reporting covered transactions; and to broaden the definition of suspicious transactions. Thus, the whole effort of 
amending the AMLA could go to waste if the FATF rejected the amendment. Rejection would imply that the Philippines would 
continue to be in the NCCT list and would suffer the countermeasures. 
 
To remedy the situation, the Arroyo Government interceded and arranged a dialogue between the lawmakers and the FATF. On 18 
February 2003, the FATF delegates and the legislators (16 Senators and a number of Congressmen) led by Senate President Franklin 
Drilon held a dinner meeting. In the meeting, the lawmakers sought the concerns of the FATF by asking its delegates about specific 
provisions they want to include or exclude in the AMLA. In turn, the lawmakers put forward proposals on which they sought the 
approval of the FATF delegates. After “getting the nod” of the delegates, Senate President Drilon requested that the gentlemen’s 
agreement be put into writing to make sure no “slip-up” could happen in redrafting the bill. 
 
The agreement implied that the already approved BCC report would be substantially changed. This scenario implied two things: first, 
there was a need to redraft the bill and reconstitute the BCC; and second, the imposition of the agreement over the reconstituted 
BCC would mean that the members could not make any changes beyond those things approved by the FATF. Thus, acceding to the 
FATF demand necessitated “ditching” the BCC report, which was a genuine product of the institutional policy actors’ engagement in 
the policymaking process, and “tying the hands” of the BCC members as well as the whole Congress, as their freedom to discuss and 
propose was constricted by the agreement. 
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Conforming to the agreement, on 4 March the legislators reconvened the BCC to redraft the bill. During the deliberations, the 
Senate and House leadership reminded the members that they needed to strictly follow the agreement to avoid the risk of inserting 
stipulations unacceptable to the FATF. As Senator Edgardo Angara warned, adding one word or another inadvertently may require 
another round of negotiations with the FATF. The next day, the reconstituted BCC report was forwarded and ratified in both 
chambers. The resulting act, R.A. 9194, was signed into law by the President on 7th March 2003. 
 
Power in decision-making refers to the ability to control the process of making choices as well as reaching the outcome.  In the 
decision making for the AMLA, the institutional policy actors were compelled by the FATF to enact and amend the law within a given 
time frame. The insistence of the FATF provided enough impetus for the lawmakers to rework the content of the AMLA to ensure 
that the law conformed to the 49 + 9 Recommendations.  
 
 
5. Power as Context Shaping 
 
The FATF influence on the Philippine policymaking process was further reinforced by the contemporary dynamics of the global 
financial structure. The integration of the financial system has altered the underpinning of the state’s authority in making policies. In 
the  realm  of  financial  regulations,  the  influence  of  international  organizations has  intensified  and  transcended  the  territorial 
jurisdiction of states. Globalization, depicted as increasing financial interdependence, has further hastened the change. “Globalized 
international financial markets are more open, more liquid and more internationally integrated than ever before” [8]. In effect, 
financial transactions became open and instantaneous. With this unprecedented financial mobility, issues such as the danger posed 
by the erratic financial system emerged and necessitated coordination and cooperation among states. “All the crises of the 1990s 
highlighted the vulnerability of national financial systems and the need for countries participating in the global financial system to 
have strong standards of accounting, prudential regulation, disclosure, exchange and so forth” [8]. Avoiding such financial crises in 
one area or region cannot anymore be done in isolation, as the crisis can easily spill over to other states.  
 
Handling the vulnerabilities of the globalized financial structure created the need for financial regulations. The effectiveness of 
financial  regulations was premised on  each state adopting as well as abiding by these regulations. At present,  the  worldwide 
responsibility for disseminating the financial regulations has been taken over extensively by international organizations. The task has 
provided the impetus and rationale for international organizations to encroach on domestic policymaking and, consequently, has 
tremendously  increased  the  influence  of  international  financial  organizations  on  the  institutional policy  actors  and  the  policy 
process. In this global financial setup, interference by international organizations in external policy was acceptable and considered 
legitimate.  
 
In  managing  the  contemporary  global  financial structure, international organizations have  relied principally on the concept of 
international regimes. International regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” [9]. Simply put, international regimes can be 
construed as “sets of governing arrangements” [10] imposed on the international community. International regimes, which include 
informal customs and formal negotiated agreements, affect states’ behavior as well as international relations. In global finance, 
financial regimes aim to regulate states’ behavior and promote international cooperation to promote global financial stability. 
Financial regimes are formalized into treaties or international agreements to make them binding to states. In addition, treaties and 
agreements usually prescribe formal and informal penalties and are administered by specialized international organizations [11]. The 
administering  organization  functions  as  the  principal  regulator  and  enforcer  of  the  regime,  as  it  could  impose  sanctions  to 
recalcitrant states. For instance, the international trade regime is underpinned by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
international financial regime is backstopped by the IMF and WB. 
 
In view of the worldwide proliferation of illicit money and terrorist finance, the AML regime was established. The AML regime 
promoted the global adoption of laws and regulations that address the problem of the unhampered flow of illicit money. Specifically, 
the AML regime mandated that all states legislate a financial regulation that combats money laundering and terrorist financing. The 
FATF, after its formation, became the official regulator and enforcer of the AML regime. On one hand, the FATF regulates by 
requiring that the law passed by each state conform to the FATF-imposed international standards. The condition was instituted to 
ensure consistency among the laws crafted by states and effective global implementation. On the other hand, the FATF enforces by 
imposing sanctions on nonconforming states. In a sense, the capacity to inflict punitive measures makes the AML regime compulsory 
rather than voluntary.  
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The AML regime places strong incentives for compliance and penalizes uncooperative behavior. The Philippines, as one of the 
countries identified as NCCT, hardly has any choice but to accede to the AML regime, as the country would be taking enormous fiscal 
and monetary risk if it decides to disregard the AML regime. As the FATF could impose sanctions, the AML regime has “a critical 
impact on what policy makers can and cannot do and the policy choices they make” [11]. The Philippines cannot afford to become a 
pariah state; as long as economic development is a principal agenda, the government cannot isolate itself from the international 
financial institutions and the global capitalist economy. 
 
Moreover, the global financial structure is highly skewed, as the financial regimes were determined and set up by wealthy and 
powerful states, and “ordinary” states were bound to follow. As financial regimes were used to compel, indirect power was utilized 
on other states. Likewise, the exercise of indirect power opened the possibility of employing direct powers, as the former serves as 
the basis for the exercise of the latter. In this global setup, the Philippines has negligible influence on the FATF as well as inadequate 
capacity  to  resist  pressures  from  the  AML  regime.  This  was  exemplified  by  the extraordinary  efforts  taken by  the  Philippine 
government to enact the AMLA, such as the marathon deliberations, the amendment proceedings, and redrafting of the BCC report 
to conform to the FATF standard. This experience was shared by NCCTs, as all the blacklisted states took immediate action to comply 
with the AML regime. The clout of the AML regime over states was overwhelming, as even Myanmar, which is considered a rogue 
state, took serious action to comply with the FATF demand (In the 2006 FATF Report, Myanmar was removed from the NCCT 
list).Thus the action taken by the Philippines and the other blacklisted states showed the effectiveness as well as the entrenched 
status of the AML regime in the present global financial structure. 
 
The dynamics of the global financial structure have made international regimes the mode for policy co-optation, and international 
organizations as legitimate policy actors. The AML regime has restricted the parameters for policy decisions of the institutional 
actors and sanctioned the management of the policy process by the FATF from the outside, so to speak. Moreover, the financial 
structure, as it puts limits to a state’s policy choices and process, exemplifies the exercise of indirect power as well as serves as the 
basis for the exercise of direct powers. Thus, the exercise of agenda-setting and decision-making powers exhibited by the FATF in the 
enactment of the AMLA was made possible and reinforced by the context-shaping power of the prevailing financial structure. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In  the  contemporary  era of financial globalization,  the AMLA was the byproduct of  the  skewed  relations of power  politics  in 
policymaking. By convention, lawmaking is a domestic process where the institutional actors and the executive and legislative 
branches are the central policy actors. The experience in creating the AMLA altered the power dynamics, as the FATF dominated the 
institutional actors. The FATF influenced the policymaking by exercising agenda-setting and decision-making powers on executive 
officials and the legislators. In agenda setting, the institutional policy actors were obliged to prioritize the consideration of and 
deliberation on the financial regulation. In decision-making, the institutional policy actors were compelled to enact and rework, 
within a time frame, the content of the policy to conform to the FATF standard. The FATF employed mainly the threat of sanctions in 
exercising these powers. The use of the agenda-setting and decision-making powers was made possible and reinforced by the 
context-shaping power of the prevailing financial structure. In context shaping, the institutional actors were bound to enact the 
policy because of the prevailing AML regime established by the FATF, as noncompliance would make the Philippines an outcast 
state. Overall, the FATF influenced the lawmaking process and content of the AMLA through the use of direct and indirect powers. 
 
The lawmaking process that produced the AMLA manifested the relationship among the different types of power. The agenda-
setting power focused on the introduction of the policy, the decision-making power emphasized the deliberations on the substance 
of the policy, and the context-shaping power dealt with the effect of the prevailing global financial structure on the policy dynamics. 
The enactment of the AMLA exemplified the use of several dimensions of power as well as the connection among them, as each 
dimension  reinforced  the  use of the other dimensions. Thus, the AMLA illustrates that  to have a better analytical  grasp and 
understanding of the policy process, the outcome, and the contextual dynamics, all possible sources of power must be considered in 
the policymaking equation. 
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